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. ~ [Crim. No. 12972. In Bank. May 14,1969.] 
In re GlWRGE WII.JLIAM BENNETT on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] .Prisons and Prisoners-Parole.-Although an Adult Authority 
order canceling a habeas corpus petitioner's parole, based on 
a parole report specifying among other things that petitioner 
had violated Pen. Code, §§ 207 and 288a, was preliminary in 
nature, it was effective to refix petitioner's term at maximum, 
where it was based on a reasonable belief that good cause 
exi!Oted for the action and was proper to protect the Adult 
Authority's jurisdiction pending disposition of the criminal 
charges; and the order continued in effect until the Adult 
Authority issued a final order revoking parole. 
[2] Id.-Parole-Revocation.-The Adult Authority has power to 
revoke parole when the presence of a parolee at large in a 
community may entail danger to society; thus an Adult Au-
thority parole report recommendation, made while a prelimi-
nary order of cancellation was in effect, that a parolee be 
returned to prison for the protection of society, was sufficiellt 
cause for revocation of parole, where it was supported by 
evidence that medical authorities considered the parolee sane 
but extremely dangerous. 
[3] Criminal Law-Punis~ment-Computation of Term-Insane 
Prisoners. - Pen. Code, § 2685, relating to credit for time 
passed at a state hospital by an insane prisoner, states a 
legislative policy that insane prisoners receive credit on their 
terms while undergoing treatment in state hospitals; and thf> 
Legislature did not mean to deny credit when a court commits 
a prisoner on parole to a state hospital by specifically provid-
ing for credit when a prisoner is transferred to a state hospital 
by the Director of Corrections. 
[4] Prisons and Prisoners-Fixing Term of Imprisonmen~Credit 
for Time in State Hospital.-A prisoner on parole who has 
been committed to a state hospital under Pen. Code, § 1026, 
or §§ 1367-1375, has been returned to custody and is not "an 
escape and fugitive from justice" within the meaning of Pen. 
Code, § 3064, providing that no part of the time during which 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Prisons and Prisoners, § 129; Am.Jur., 
Pardon, Reprieve and Amnesty (1st ed § 94). 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Prisons and Prisoners, § 42. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Prisons and Prisoners, § 130. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Prisons and Prisoners, § 15; [3] 
Criminal Law, § 1483; [4] Prisons and Prisoners, § 14(1); [5] 
Prisons and Prisoners, § 6. 
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a parolee is an escape and fugitive from justice shall be part 
of his term. 
[5] Id.-CustodY and Control of Prisoners-Effect of Commitment 
to State Hospital.-The fact that an insane prisoner is com-
mitted to a state hospital by court order rather than trans-
ferred there by the Director of Corrections affords no ra-
tional basis for evading the policy of Pen. Code, § 2685, that 
prisoners receive credit on their term while undergoing treat-
ment in state hospitals. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody on the ground that petitioner's parole had been unlaw-
fully revoked and he had been denied credit for time spent in 
a state hospital. Writ granted. 
Lionel K. Hvolboll, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assist-
nnt Attorney General, Edward A. Hinz, Jr., John Fourt and 
Bdsel \V. Haws, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner, an inmate of Folsom State 
Prison, seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the 
.\dult Authority unlawfully revoked his parole and denied 
him credit 011 his prison term for the time he spent in Atas-
cadero State Hospital under commitment orders of the Los 
Angeles Superior Court. 
On December 29, 1958, petitioner was sentenced to impris-
onment in the state prison for the term prescribed by law for 
a violation of Penal Code section 487.2 (grand theft from the 
person of another). On January 8,1959, he began serving his 
sentence, which had a 10-year maximum. (Pen. Code, §§ 489 
and 2900.) Petitioner was paroled in 1960, but in 1961 this 
parole was revoked, and his term was refixed at the maximum. 
In July 1962, the Adult Authority tentatively fixed his term 
at six and one-half years with parole for two and one-haH 
years 1tnd set July 9, 1965 as the new discharge date. On 
January 9, 1963, petitioner was released on parole. 
In May 1963 an information charged petitioner with viola· 
tions of Penal Code sections 207 and 288a. In July 1963 thE 
Los Angeles Superior Court found him to be presently insanE 
and committed him to Atascadero State Hospital for care ane 
treatment. (Pen. Code, §§ 1370-1372.) 
In August 1963 the Adult Authority cancelled petitioner'i 
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parole and ordered his return to prison on the basis of a 
parole report specifying three violations of petitioner's condi. 
tions of parole as cause for this action: (1) petitioner 
changed his residence in March 1963 without permission of 
his parole agent, (2) petitioner failed to submit monthly 
reports since March 1963, and (3) petitioner violated Penal 
Code sections 207 and 288a. 
Petitioner remained at Atascadero until January 1966, 
when it was determined that he had sufficiently recovered his 
sanity to stand trial. He was then returned to the superior 
court. After a trial he was found not guilty by reason of 
insanity. The court determined that he had not fully recov-
ered his sanity and recommitted him to Atascadero pursuant 
to Penal Code section 1026. On October 31, 1967, the superior 
court found petitioner to be then sane and ordered his release. 
On November 8, 1967, petitioner was taken into custody by 
the Adult Authority. A new parole report charged petitioner 
with the 1963 violations and with changing his residence upon 
lIis release by the superior court from Atascadero to Los 
Angeles without permission of his parole agent. The report 
stated that petitioner was presently sane but that the Atasca-
dero authorities considered him still extremely dangerous. The 
report "recommended that he be returned to prison at this 
time, for the protection of society." The Adult Authority 
arrived at a new date of discharge, March 30, 1973, by adding 
to the maximum sentence the four years, three months and 
twenty-one days between the cancellation of petitioner's 
parole in 1963 and his return to the custody of the Adult 
Authority. On January 26, 1968, petitioner pleaded guilty to 
the parole violation charges, and after a hearing the Adult 
Authority 'revoked his parole. 
Petitioner contends that since a person is not criminally 
responsible for his acts while insane (Pen. Code, § 26, sUbd. 
Three), conduct of an insane parolee that violates the condi-
tions of his parole cannot constitute cause for revocation of 
parole. (See Pen. Code, § 3063.) Since he was insane when he 
violated the conditions of his parole in 1963, he concludes that 
his parole was illegally revoked for these violations and that 
his term for the 1958 grand theft conviction therefore expired 
on July 9, 1965, as fixed by the Adult Authority in 1962. 'Ve 
cannot accept this conclusion. 
[1] Although the Adult Authority's 1963 order cancelling 
petitioner's parole was preliminary in nature, it was effective 
to refix petitioner's term at maximum, for it was based on a 
I 
I 
I 
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reasonable belief that good cause existed for that action. (In 
re Brown (1967) 67 Ca1.2d 339, 341-342 [62 Cal.Rptr. 6, 431 
P.2d 630].) As in the Brown case, the Adult Authority's 
action was proper to protect its jurisdiction pending disposi-
tion of the criminal charges. The order continued in effect 
until the Adult Authority issued a final order revoking peti-
tioner's parole in 1967. [2] \Vhile the preliminary order 
was in effect the Adult Authority issued another report that 
reviewed the prior charges, reaffirmed its 1963 order, added 
another charge, and discussed petitioner's subsequent history. 
This report stated that when petitioner was released from 
Atascadero, the medical authorities considered him sane but 
extremely dangerous, and the report recommended his return 
to prison for the protection of society. Because the Adult 
Authority has power to revoke parole when the presence of a 
parolee at large in the community may entail danger to soci-
ety, this recommendation, supported by medical evidence, was 
sufficient cause for the revocation of petitioner's parole. 
The question remains whether the Adult Authority erred in 
denying petitioner credit for the time he spent at Atascadert} 
pursuant to commitment orders of the superior court. 
Penal Code section 3064 provides: "From and after the 
suspension or revocation of the parole of any prisoner and 
until his return to custody he shall be deemed an escape and 
fugitive from justice and no part of the time during which he 
is an escape and fugitive from justice shall be part of his 
term. ' , We thus confront the question: Has a person who has 
been committed to the custody of the medical authorities at 
Atascadero by orders of the superior court pursuant to Penal 
Code sections 1026 and 1367-1372 been returned to custody 
within the meaning of Penal Code section 3064 T 
An insane prisoner may be transferred to the custody of the 
Department of Mental Hygiene by the Director of Corrections 
with the approval of the Adult Authority if the Director of 
Corrections believes that the prisoner's rehabilitation may be 
expedited by treatment at a state mental hospital. (Pen. Code, 
§ 2684.) Atascadero is an institution under the jurisdiction of 
the Department of Mental Hygiene. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§§ 4001, 4100.) Penal Code section 2685 provides that" ... 
The time passed at the state hospital [pursuant to section 
2684] shall count as part of the prisoner's sentence." The 
Attorney General contends that since Penal Code sections 
]026 and 1367-1375 contain no similar provisions for credit on 
a preexisting sentence for time spent jn a state hospital, a 
) 
vi . 
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prisoner on parole committed under· those sections has not 
been returned to custody within the meaning of Penal Code 
section 3064. We do not agree. 
[3] Section 2685 states a legislative policy that insane 
prisoners receive credit on their terms while undergoing treat-
ment in state hospitals. It does not follow because that 
section specifically provides for credit when a prisoner is 
transferred to a state hospital by the Director of Corrections 
that the Legislature meant to deny credit when a court com-
mits a prisoner on parole to a state hospital. [4] Under 
section 3064 credit is denied only to "an escape and fugitive 
from justice." A prisoner on parole who has been committed 
to a state hospital under section 1026 or sections 1367-1375 
has certainly been returned to custody and is not" an escape 
and fugitive from justice" within the meaning of section 
3064. (See I'll, re Fluery (1967) 67 Ca1.2d 600, 603 [63 Cal. 
Rptr. 298,432 P.2d 986] ; I'll, re Patton (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 
83, 90 [36 Cal. Rptr. 864].) 
To deny credit for commitments under those sections would 
open the door to arbitrary discrimin~tions involving insane 
prisoners on parole. For example, if the prosecuting attorney 
decided not to prosecute a parolee for committing a criminal 
act, the Adult Authority revoked his parole, and the Depart-
ment of Corrections transferred him to a state hospital, Penal 
Code section 2£85 would operate to give him credit for time. 
spent in the state hospital. On the other hand, if the prosecut-
ing attorney brought the parolee into court before the Adult 
Authority returned him to its custody, he would not receive 
credit for time spent in the same state hospital pursuant to a 
court order. Thus, the effect of denying credit in the latter 
situation would allow the prosecuting attorney to determine 
that the term of a parolee who commits a criminal act should 
be extended. The prosecuting attorney's function is to deter-
mine, not whether the term of such a parolee should be 
extended, but whether the parolee should be prosecuted for 
the criminal act. 
The purpose of a commitment to a state hospital is to 
rehabilitate and restore the sanity of the insane prisoner. The 
treatment devoted thereto will presumably be the same 
regardless of which code provision underlies the prisoner's 
presence in the hospital. [5] The fact that he is committed 
to a state hospital by court order rather than transferred 
there by the Director of Corrections affords no rational basis 
for evading the pQlicy of section 2685 that prisoners receive 
, ..... ----..... 
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credit on their terms while undergoing treatment in state 
hospitals. 
In re rutze (1968) 6H Cal.2d 389 [71 Cal.Rptr. 673,445 
P.2d 289], and In rc Gullatt (1968) 69 Ca1.2d 395 [71 Cal. 
Rptr. 676, 445 P.2d 292], are not contrary to our decision 
herein. In those cases, a state parolee was convicted in a 
federal court and sentenced to serve time in a federal institu-
tion. In each ease, lle sought a determination that ti"me so 
served should be credited on his state term. We held that 
custody under section 3064 does not include confinement in a 
federal institution under sentence imposed upon judgment of 
conviction in a federal court, on the ground that by designat-
ing where such a sentence shall be served the Attorney 
General of the United States determines whether federal- and 
state sentences run consecutively, or concurrently. (See also, 
In re Campbell (1939) 36 Cal.App.2d 221 [97 P.2d 482].) 
Accordingly, neither case has any bearing on the meaning of 
section 3064 as it applies to confinement pursuant to an order 
of a court of this state in a state hospital in which a Califor-
nia prisoner nlay serve his sentence. 
Final1y, we note as we did in In re Bevill (1968) 68 Ca1.2d 
854,863 [69 Cal.Rptr. 599, 442 P.2d 679], "It is unnecessary 
to state, of course, that nothing we decide here precludes the 
initiation of civil commitment proceedings under any appro-
priate statute." , 
With credit for the time spent in Atascadero State Hospital 
following the cancellation of his parole, petitioner's maximum 
term expired in January 1969. The writ is therefore granted 
and petitioner is discharged from custody .. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J .. 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 11, 
1969. 
